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Introduction by
Richard B. Miller
Director, Poynter Center for the Study of
Ethics and American Institutions

Over the course of the 2004-05
academic year, six faculty from IU
Bloomington met ten times to read and
discuss materials on “The Ethics and Politics
of Childhood,” the theme for the second
annual Poynter Center Interdisciplinary
Faculty Fellowship and Seminar.
Drawing on moral philosophy, cultural
studies, political theory, legal decisions, and
American literature, the seminar set out to
explore a series of questions surrounding
children and our responsibilities toward
them. If there is any one universal
experience, it is that we were all young
once. Yet our experiences of youth and the
moral issues surrounding our relationships
with parents, cultural, religious and
educational authorities, and the state remain
relatively unexplored. Our seminar thus tried
to sort out questions regarding the nature
and grounding of children’s rights, the
duties of love and justice toward children,
claims that cultural, political, and religious
groups may make on behalf of a child’s
welfare, and the moral basis of the family,
among other topics. We looked at debates
about the role of public education in the
civic and moral formation of children; the
rise of the home schooling movement; issues
regarding the gestation, design, and rearing
of children; and the grounds and limits of
parental authority. All of these topics spark
reflection about, and enlist theoretical help
from, more general claims regarding human
freedom, the relationship between families
and the state, and the claims of identity and
cultural background in childhood
development.
The essay by Aviva Orenstein that
follows grows out of the seminar’s year-long
interaction. Professor Orenstein was one of
the fellows. My aim here is to provide a
preface to Professor Orenstein’s paper that
summarizes some of the seminar’s
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to claim or use them. We also asked whether
the language of rights is the best way to
frame adults’ responsibilities toward
children, especially if we view such
responsibilities as involving family ties that
are of an unusually intimate sort.

reflections and discussions over the course
of the 2004-05 year.
First, a word about the topic: My
rationale for choosing this topic was that
little sustained work has addressed adults’
moral responsibilities toward children or
children’s responsibilities toward
themselves and others. That lacuna is
striking given the universality of childhood
experience and the importance of relating to
children in families, schools, and civil
society. Children seem strangely “orphaned”
by intellectuals. Creating a bibliography that
captures features of childhood experience
along with their moral and political
dimensions was one of our aims.

Such questions have moral and legal
dimensions. On the moral side, we asked
how a right to an open future connects, if at
all, to many parents’ desires to provide “the
best” for their children. How does the quest
for “better children” stack up to the
affirmation of a right to an open future? Are
there limits to demands that many parents
pursue in the training and medical treatment
of their children? Is the pursuit of better
children aiming to help them exercise that
right, or does it suggest narrowing the
options for a child? We thus asked how
“open” an “open future” can be. On the legal
side, we examined the extent to which such
a right empowers the state to intrude into
family matters, and whether such intrusions
constitute an unusual sort of infringement.
This is an especially sensitive matter given
the privacy we attach to families as a
condition for respecting the liberty of
individuals and the value of family intimacy.

We organized our initial set of readings
in a series of concentric circles. (For a copy
of our syllabus, please consult our website at
http://poynter.indiana.edu/fellows04.shtml#
Readings.) We began with an effort to think
about childhood experience and to consider
differences between a child’s and an adult’s
experience of the world. We thus asked
whether childhood is a stage or a state,
whether it should be seen as a condition of
innocence or diabolical adventure, and how
we might consider questions of dependence
and independence of children as they grow.

Questions surrounding a child’s
experience of intimacy in family life lead
naturally into questions about the moral
basis of the family and whether it constitutes
a unique kind of social unit. Here the
question was not whether the family
contributes something valuable to the state,
but whether there are intrinsic goods to the
family. What legitimizes the family as a
social entity, as opposed to cults, clubs,
friendships, political parties, and other social
groups? Are there moral goods intrinsic to
the family that allows us to assign a specific
sphere to it as a social unit? That is to say, is
there something about the nature of the
family that provides a basis for morally
evaluating actual family arrangements and

We then asked how we might theorize
about children’s rights in light of inferences
we drew from accounts of childhood
experience. If there is something special
about childhood either as a stage or a state,
then perhaps there is something unusual
about the sorts of rights we might attach to
children. We discussed at length the idea
from Joel Feinberg that children have a right
to an “open future”— a right held in trust
now for certain protections and entitlements
that a child is due later, as an adult. The
right to an open future refers to rights that
are saved for young persons until they reach
adulthood, but which can be violated
prematurely, before a young person is able
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whether family love qualifies or modifies
the application of justice. That is to say,
should justice constrain love, and if so, does
that endanger it? Or is it the case that family
justice ought to be qualified, perhaps
tempered, by love?

relationships? In a related vein, we might
ask if there are moral reasons for having
children.
One way to approach these matters is to
say, following Ferdinand Shoeman, that
adults have the right to enter into certain
kinds of special relationships. We esteem
families, in other words, because they
provide the locus for forming unique kinds
of connections, connections that are
unavailable to us in other social contexts.
Yet esteeming families because they enable
adults to satisfy a basic set of rights seems
strange, or at least limited. It appears to
ignore the goods that children experience in
families independent of whether their
parents are satisfying a set of rights-claims.
Given that fact, we were led to ask about
other goods or values are that are relevant to
the intrinsic goodness of the family.

Families, of course, do not exist in a
cultural, political, or social vacuum. They
are prime “carriers” of customs and
traditions. Thus the seminar focused on the
relationship between children, families, and
cultural traditions. One question is whether
there is something special about culture that
marks it off as a unique kind of good. Often
we connect considerations of culture with
the good of identity formation. But basic
questions about how to triangulate the
values attached to cultures, families, and a
respect for children are nettlesome.
For example, we might ask whether
children are entitled to being enculturated by
their parents and, if so, whether any set of
cultural traditions will do. Put differently, it
is an open question whether parents have the
duty to bestow their cultural beliefs on their
children. If they do have such a duty, then
parents commit some kind of wrong by not
socializing their children within a particular
culture, or by not passing along their cultural
traditions (if they have them). Rarely,
however, do we in fact censure parents for
failing to transmit cultural traditions that
they don’t endorse.

Guidance on this basic question might
be provided by the principles of love and
justice. On the one hand, the idea of a “right
to enter into certain kinds of special
relationships” suggests that we look at
justice as providing a basis for thinking
about the moral basis for the family. Justice
provides a critical principle, although
perhaps a limited one, for evaluating
parental decisions and family life more
generally. At a minimum, it protects against
families becoming small despotisms.
But many of us also experience family
love as unconditionally accepting.
Moreover, within families we experience
mutual flourishing, intimacy, and
meaningful experiences as part of the
inherent goods of family life. Those facts
seem not to sit comfortably with the idea of
“family justice.” It seems odd to say that
love should be the subject of a “claim.”
Thus the seminar asked if family love
presupposes justice as a primary virtue, or

A related set of issues turns on whether
parents have a right to enculturate their
children. If they do, then we might ask
whether this right is any different from the
sort of rights we generally assign to parents
by virtue of their authority in the family.
We might also ask if there are restrictions on
this right. Naturally such a right is likely
bump up against the rights that we
considered at the outset of the seminar. If
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contexts, rights to health care, research on
children in educational settings, and the
home schooling movement.

children have rights, then those rights may
limit what parents can do in the name of
transmitting cultural values. We examined
these questions in light of important legal
decisions, including Yoder v. Wisconsin.
Encircling the child, his or her parents
and family, and the family’s cultural and
religious traditions, is the state. Given the
assumption that the state has an interest in
forming citizens and that citizenship
involves a certain set of virtues and
dispositions, we were led to ask how to
integrate the role of the state into
considerations of cultural transmission and
moral formation. Of special relevance is the
role of educational institutions in such
matters. The state’s interest in forming
citizens must, of course, be situated in
relation to parents’ interests in the kind of
child they want to raise, and the interests
that children may have independently of
family, cultural, or state interests. There is
also the delicate issue of the extent to which
the state in a liberal democracy can presume
to transmit moral values that seem to extend
beyond those of a civic sort.
Attention to educational matters also
leads naturally to considerations of the sort
of “reason” that should be cultivated in
schools. Sometimes such reason chafes
against the traditions, cultural norms, or
belief systems of families. The seminar thus
considered questions of “public
reasonableness” civic virtue, and the skills
of democratic participation as necessary
ingredients in the civic formation of
children.
The seminar participants used our
discussions as a platform for launching a
series of independent research projects.
These projects took up questions regarding
the practical and moral challenges of
working with divorced parents in legal
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Introduction

The Ethics of Child Custody
Evaluation:
Advocacy, Respect for Parents, and
the Right to an Open Future

This paper considers the question of
child custody in light of children’s rights.
After presenting background on child
custody disputes, it employs Joel Feinberg’s
notion of a right to an open future and Sigal
Benporath’s emphasis on valuing childhood
to explore how the state should determine
custody in contested cases, and what role, if
any, the desires of the child should play in
the resolution of such cases. This paper
focuses on the role of the Guardian Ad
Litem (GAL), who conducts investigations
and advises family court judges. It
concludes that children must be respected
but cannot dictate custody issues, despite
their intense interest in the outcome. It
criticizes the intense adversarial atmosphere
in which custody decisions are made, even
by supposedly non-adversarial Guardians
Ad Litem charged with representing the best
interests of the child. This paper argues that
it is nonsensical to think of children’s
interests in a vacuum and that the GAL must
consider the interests of the family as a
whole. Although the focus is on the role of
the GAL, the analysis has important
implications for the behavior of judges,
attorneys, and parents as well.

Aviva Orenstein1

The Fight for Child Custody in American
Courts
Children have to belong somewhere
and, at least when they are young, to
someone. There are many hard-to-adopt
children languishing in foster care. When no
one can care for a child, it becomes the
government’s responsibility to do so and to
make significant choices that will
profoundly affect the child’s future. At the
opposite extreme, there are also intense
fights over child custody, where too many
people want the same child. Parents (and
sometimes others involved in the children’s

1

Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law – Bloomington. I would like to thank the
Poynter Center for the Study of Ethics and American
Institutions for creating and hosting the excellent
interdisciplinary seminar on the Ethics and Politics of
Childhood, the Law School for sponsoring my
participation, and my fellow Poynter Center seminar
participants. Also thanks to Indiana University’s
Law and Society Workshop, Amy Applegate,
Jeannine Bell, Seth Lahn, Leandra Lederman,
Christiana Ochoa, Sean Pager, and David Szonyi, for
their comments on an earlier draft. All mistakes and
excesses are entirely my own.

5

lives) may wage fierce battles over the right
to live with and raise a given child. When
the adults cannot agree, it is again the
government’s responsibility to intervene,
this time to determine the legal and physical
custody of the child. The government must
arbitrate which adults will care for the child
and where the child will live and spend her
time. The state must make important, and
sometimes immutable, choices about the
child’s future. This decision, made by a
family court judge, usually reflects the
judge’s determination of “the best interests
of the child,” a term that has a distinctly
paternalistic ring. The decision is actually
framed, however, in terms of the custody
rights of the adults, which evokes ancient
notions of children as property.

In ancient and early common law,
children were deemed property, and the
father automatically possessed custody of
them.4 In the nineteenth century, notions of
childhood shifted. Children became less
important for their contributions as workers
and childhood was conceived as a time for
education and nurture, at least for the upper
classes. The presumption of custody with
the father yielded to the recognition,
especially in the “tender years,” of a child’s
need for maternal care.5 In the United States
today there is no formal presumption in
favor of either parent, though many fathers
still claim that a strong bias exists against
them. More women have sole custody, but
this is in part because many men do not seek
it.6

In most decisions about child custody,
for good or ill, biology trumps all other
emotional and affiliational connections.
This principle of preferring blood over
attachment is debatable and transparently
unhelpful when parents divorce. Each parent
has an equal biological (or in the case of an
adoptive parent, legal) claim to the right to
rear the child. In the majority of cases, the
parents reach agreement on their own and
manage to settle issues of custody without
third-party involvement.2 Only a small
number of cases go to trial, and fewer still
are litigated.3 However, when there is no
agreement, the situation can be explosive.
The government, then, must decide by
whom the child will be raised.

In contested cases, courts must
determine not only who will have physical
custody, but who will have legal custody,
thereby determining the child’s medical
care, schooling, and religious upbringing.
Many states recognize the concept of joint
legal custody, allowing both parents a say
regarding education, religion, and other
long-range child-rearing decisions.
However, in intensely contested custody
4

Allan Roth, “The Tender Years: Presumption in
Child Custody Disputes,” Journal of Family Law
Quarterly 15 (1977): 423, 425-28, noting the
ancient Roman roots of the early common law’s
vesting custody in the father.
5
Solangel Maldonado, “Beyond Economic
Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to
Parent,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153
(2005): 921, 963. See quotation, “until the mid1970’s, child custody law expressly favored mothers,
entitling them to custody of children of ‘tender years’
unless they were unfit.” Roth, “The Tender Years,”
pp 432-38, noting that even where the law had
become more egalitarian, courts still favored the
mother for custody, especially during the tender
years. Henry H. Foster & Doris J. Freed, “Life with
Father: 1978,” Family Law Quarterly 11 (1978): 321,
325-29.
6
Maccoby & Mnookin, Dividing the Child, p. 99,
noting only 32.5% of fathers want sole custody.

2

Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin,
Dividing the Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of
Custody (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1992), p. 141. 51% of parents experienced
negligible conflict and decided issues of custody on
their own; 24% experienced mild conflict; 10%
experienced substantial conflict; and 15% intense
conflict.
3
Maccoby & Mnookin, p. 103, noting that in 80% of
the over one thousand cases they studied the parents
agreed on custody.

6

cases, where there is animosity between the
parents, joint custody is often not a suitable
option.

the children. Sometimes a parent will seek
custody as a bargaining ploy, a vindictive
maneuver, or as an attempt to avoid paying
child support. More often, in my
experience, parents feel a deep emotional
need and considerable social pressure to
gain custody of their children.

Complicating what is already a difficult
and intrusive decision by government is the
fact that this very tough decision about a
child’s future must be made at a time of
great emotional instability and strife in the
life of everyone involved.7 Children may
feel guilt, shock, fear, sadness, loneliness,
distress, or anger about the dissolution of
their parents’ marriage.8 It is often a time of
upheaval and economic uncertainty.
Children may need extra reassurance that the
parent who left the marital home still desires
a continuing relationship.9 Parents are often
preoccupied by recriminations and regret,
and suffer a diminished capacity to parent.10
They are angry, wounded, stressed, anxious,
depressed and sometimes even temporarily
crazed—not in good frames of mind for
making crucial long-term decisions about
their children’s welfare.11 Although
divorcing parents feud about material things,
by far the most excruciating conflicts, public
and private, legal and informal, occur over
custody, care, education, and visitation of

The process for deciding custody and
visitation varies somewhat from state to
state, but rests essentially with an evaluation
of the best interests of the child. The law in
my home state of Indiana, for instance,
mirrors the uniform child custody law,
delineating various factors for the bestinterests analysis. Relevant factors include:
the age and sex of the child; the wishes of
the child (with more consideration given to
the child’s wishes if the child is at least
fourteen years old); the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his
parents, siblings and other significant
people; the child’s adjustment to his home,
school, and community; and the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved. 12
Custody evaluation rests ultimately in
the hands of a family court judge who
operates without a jury and, except in cases
of truly preposterous decisions, renders
judgments that are essentially insulated from
further review. The trial judge’s factual
findings are granted great deference and the
appellate courts will not revisit a ruling
except in cases of abuse of discretion or
misapplication of the law.13 Custody cases

7

Lee E. Teitelbaum, “Divorce, Custody, Gender, and
the Limits of Law: On Dividing the Child,”
Michigan Law Review 92 (1994): 1816. “If there is
one thing about which virtually everyone interested
in divorce and custody would agree, it is that this
process involves, and perhaps creates, the most
deeply antagonistic relations suffered by humans in
modern society.”
8
See Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly,
Surviving the Breakup (New York: Basic Books,
1996), pp. 34-95.
9
Wallerstein & Kelly, p. 48.
10
Wallerstein & Kelly, p. 36.
11
Wallerstein & Kelly, pp. 108-131. Joan G. Wexler,
“Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody
Decrees,” Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 757-88.
“Custody controversies often represent the playing
out, for a significant period of time after the formal
divorces, of chronic unresolved and acrimonious
marital problems.”

12

Indiana Code 31-14-13-2. There are also other
factors not relevant to this analysis.
13
See Leisure v. Wheeler, 828 N.E.2d 409 (Ind. App.
2005) “In general, we review custody modifications
for abuse of discretion, with a ‘preference for
granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in
family law matters.’” Custody cases generally
revolve around facts, and rarely present novel issues
of law. Therefore, for most cases the judge’s
determination of the facts and the judge’s application
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can be reopened and changes can be made,
but there is a strong bias towards the status
quo. Alteration of the original determination
must not only reflect the child’s best
interests, it must also arise out of a
substantial change in circumstance.14

by counsel, and who because of lack of
funds, poor transportation, dead-end jobs,
and no health care, seem less stable and
dependable.
Guardians Ad Litem in Contested
Custody Cases

Custody determinations necessarily
implicate deep, sometimes unexplored
values. The subjective nature of the inquiry
into what makes a good parent and what
kind of home is good for children raises
many interesting ethical as well as
sociological concerns. Racism, sexism, and
homophobia inevitably creep into such
analyses. The history of custody
determination is replete with ridiculous
examples of such biases, such as the hippie
Dad who was denied custody because of his
lifestyle,15 or the Mom who lost custody
because she was married to a man of a
different race.16 More subtly, conscious and
unconscious cultural biases (such as those of
middle class imposed on poor people) play a
role. Judges can easily and inadvertently
impose their own value systems by, for
instance, overemphasizing the importance of
a tidy house or devaluing the danger of
exposure to domestic violence. Unspoken
but widespread institutional biases may
affect the poor who may not “clean up” as
well for court, who are often unrepresented

Deciding between two competent
loving parents can be very difficult. Families
with the means to do so often pay for
professional custody evaluations which
include home visits and a battery of
psychological evaluations. Where there are
no funds for such professional evaluators, a
family court judge will sometimes rely on a
Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The GAL is
charged with investigating the facts outside
of court and speaking for the best interests
of the child. Often the work is performed
pro bono. Sometimes GALs are social
workers and sometimes they are lawyers.17
For two years I was such a lawyer.18
My experience led me to some practical
ethical insights about the role of custody
evaluators and some tough questions about
the ethics of family lawyers generally. The
actual custody investigation varies
tremendously, but all competent GALs
should conduct multiple interviews with the
parents, caregivers, and children. Medical,
educational, and day-care records of the

of those facts to the case are a final determination of
the custody dispute.
14
A substantial change of circumstance is again a
matter left primarily to the court’s discretion, but can
include a parent’s move, the change in relationships
between parents and an older teen, incarceration, or
criminal acts by the custodial parent. Sometimes the
wishes of a child can suffice to qualify as a
substantial change as the child matures.
15
Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d
152 (1966) The father was denied custody because of
his alternative lifestyle and liberal political view as
compared to grandparent’s Midwest values.
16
Palmore v. Sidoti, 3 U.S. 429 (1984), reversing the
divesting of mother’s custody because she remarried
a black man.

17

The benefit of using lawyers as GALs is that they
are comfortable in the courtroom and can subpoena
witnesses and introduce evidence. As will be noted
below, there are also some serious liabilities that arise
from using lawyers.
18
Until recently, Indiana University Bloomington ran
a clinic for highly contested custody cases where
students, under attorney supervision, conducted
custody investigations as GALs. Our mandate came
directly from the local family-court judges, and they
sent us their more excruciating and contentious cases.
Our charge was not to represent the children in a
traditional attorney-client role. Instead, we advised
the court as to the best interests of those children.
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child should be sought. No report would be
complete without checking the parents’
driving and criminal records. Many cases
require GALs to procure health records,
including mental health records of the
parents and anyone who spends significant
time with the child. Where there is evidence
of drug addiction, parents may be subject to
drug or alcohol screens, which can be
ordered by the court if the parents do not
consent. In addition, ex-spouses, ex-in-laws,
grandparents, siblings and others can be
important sources of information. The
investigation is thorough, and, obviously,
wildly intrusive. Parents report feeling
watched and criticized to the point of not
feeling natural with their children.19

determine that even though the fourteenyear-old doesn’t want the extra supervision,
it is in her best interests and the GAL would
therefore recommend custody with the
mother.
Lawyers and scholars hotly debate how
children should be represented, whether the
traditional attorney-client role or the GAL
best interests role is preferable.21 Even
accounting for the added complexity of
differences along the child development
continuum,22 there is no agreement on the
best way to represent children in custody
cases. Some advocate strongly that children
as young as seven years old should have
lawyers represent their independent
interests.23 Those who so advocate base their
arguments on the autonomy rights of
children and the role of lawyers as agents.24
They question the appropriateness of the
GAL role arguing that a “father knows best

The GAL “Best Interests” Model versus
the Traditional Attorney-Client Model
To illustrate briefly what the difference
might be between the role of lawyer and
GAL, imagine a fourteen-year-old girl who
expresses the desire to live with her father
who works nights, and is not around to
supervise the girl’s after-school activities.
The mother and daughter have conflicted
over issues of the girl’s curfew and the girl’s
alcohol and marijuana use. A traditional
attorney representing the girl would
advocate for custody with the father since
that is what his client wants. An attorney
operating as GAL would not be obligated to
recommend that the court follow the
teenager’s desires.20 The GAL could

‘best interests’ even if those interests conflict with
the child’s preferences.”
21
There are jurisdictions where the attorneys’ role is
not so clear-cut, and in New York and New Jersey,
for instance, the Law Guardians may attempt to play
dual roles of representatives and protectors.
22
The power granted to children to direct their own
lives obviously raises definitional questions. Few
would grant such power to four year olds, many to
children on the cusp of legal majority.
23
See generally Sarah H. Ramsey, “Representation
of the Child in Protective Proceedings: The
Determination of Decision-Making Capacity,”
Family Law Quarterly 17 (1983): 287.
24
American Bar Association, “Standard of Practice
for Lawyers representing Children in Custody
Cases,” Family Law Quarterly 37 (2003): 129.
Similarly, in a major conference at Fordham Law
School conferees concluded that “lawyers serve
children best when they serve in the role as an
attorney, not as a guardian ad litem. . . . If the child
can direct the representation, the lawyer has the same
ethical obligations as the lawyer would have when
representing an adult.” “Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children,” Fordham Law Review
64 (1996): 1279, 1294-95.

19

Katie Allison Granju, “Losing Custody of My
Hope,” New York Times Styles Section (Modern
Love, 5/8/2005).
20
Andrew I. Schepard, Children, Courts, and
Custody: Interdisciplinary Models for Divorcing
Families (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004), p. 142. “A Guardian, unlike an Attorney,
protects rather than empowers the child. A
Guardian’s principal allegiance is to the court and not
to a child client. A guardian is an investigator and
reporter, bound to determine and advance the child’s
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interest” analysis is patriarchal, patronizing,
and wrong-headed.25

operates with certain disabilities in thinking
and maturity compared to adults.
Consequently, the child’s representative
may need to advocate against the stated
wishes of the child in some circumstances.

The debate tends to pit legal academics
(who, like the American Bar Association,
favor a more traditional attorney-client
relationship26) against judges and policy
makers (who tend to favor the GAL role).
Although there is variation around the
country, many states such as Indiana do not
provide children with legal mouthpieces, but
instead supply them with an adult whose job
it is zealously to represent children’s best
interests. The law of custody in Indiana
gives the child a vote, but not a veto.27 As
noted above, it considers the child’s wishes
as a factor, with the child’s wishes becoming
a more important consideration after the age
of fourteen.

This debate rests somewhat on
questions of legal ethics—when, if ever, a
lawyer should substitute his judgment for
those of his clients. It also reflects a deep
and interesting debate about the nature of
children, their capacity to know their best
interests, and their rights to influence their
futures.
The Various Interests in Custody
Determination
During a year-long multi-disciplinary
seminar on the “Ethics and Politics of
Childhood,” a group of scholars with
backgrounds in history, law, philosophy, and
education, regularly considered the question
of children’s autonomy and agency. The
issue of consulting with and deferring to
children was a persistent theme. We spent
much time trying to tease out the intricate
web of relationships among parents, child
and state. Contested custody presents a
wonderful example of all the complexities
and hidden assumptions behind these
triangulated relationships. In custody cases,
the state decides between parents on behalf
of the child. What are the child’s rights and
interests once basic needs of food, shelter,
education, and physical safety have been
met? I will address that issue after briefly
mentioning the rights and interests of the
parents and the state.

The policy behind the GAL role rests on
the belief that cognitively and emotionally,
children are not little adults, and their best
interests cannot be ascertained by treating
them as fully independent, autonomous
beings.28 This is in part because a child
25

See Peter Margulies, “The Lawyer as Caregiver:
Child Clients Competence in Context,” Fordham
Law Review 64 (1996): 1473, 1497, expressing
concern about lawyers “arrogance and ignorance” in
advocating for a child’s best interests.
26
The American Bar Association has developed a set
of ethical criteria for attorneys. It distinguishes
between a child’s attorney, who represents the child
as any other client would be represented and a “best
interest attorney,” who serves as an agent of the
court. The ABA clearly favors the traditional
attorney role. See Linda D. Elrod, “Raising the Bar
for Lawyers who Represent Children: ABA
Standards of Practice for Custody Cases,” Family
Law Quarterly 37 (2003): 105, 115.
27
See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Talking About
Children’s Rights in Judicial Custody and Visitation
Decision-Making,” Family Law Quarterly 36
(2002): 105, 123-25, which advocates a voice-but
not choice-approach to involving children in
decisions about custody.
28
See Melinda G. Schmidt, N. Dickon Reppucci &
Jennifer L. Woolard, “Effectiveness of Participation

as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client
Relationship,” Behavioral Science & Law 21 (2003):
175, 177. See “in general, children under the age of
15 have significantly poorer understanding of legal
matters relevant to their participation in trials than do
adults.”
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As to parents’ rights, they include free
expression, religious expression, and
privacy. A key human right is the
fundamental right to procreate. That right is
hollow if, once the child is born, the parents
are prevented from raising the child and
transmitting their values. For many people,
their own liberty interests will be limited if
they cannot guide their children’s future and
protect their communities by passing on
culture and knowledge to their progeny.29
Relatedly, the ability to pass on religious
doctrine requires control and influence over
one’s children. The parents’ religious
expression may be deeply connected to
childrearing means and ends.

involved, the state must provide the parties
involved with a clear and final accounting of
their various parental rights and
responsibilities regarding the children
involved.
Finally, and most importantly for the
purposes of this analysis, is the question of
the child’s rights. At the extremes, there is
much agreement about the nature of
children’s rights. Few advocate for allowing
kids to vote or drink alcohol, and almost
everyone supports certain claim rights of
children to food, shelter and freedom from
physical harm. However, the extent of
children’s rights to be consulted and perhaps
even deferred to in making important life
decisions prompts lively debate.

The state’s interests in custody reflect
the state’s multiple roles. The state has a
role as parens patriae, serving to protect
minors and others who do not possess legal
competency to protect themselves. The
government also wants to promote an
educated citizenry that can participate in and
perpetuate democracy. The state, in addition
to protecting children and molding our
young breed, must protect society from
children. Its duty to protect the general
welfare means that the state must make sure
that unruly children do not threaten safety
and stability; the state want to prevent their
child-citizens from growing up to be dangers
to their fellow citizens life, liberty and
property. To the extent the state can identify
involved, functioning parents, it is in its
interest to do so to avoid footing the bill for
welfare, foster care, or future jail time.
Finally, the state has a role as arbiter of civil
disputes. To keep the peace, and to clarify
the rights and obligations of everyone

Feinberg’s Right to an Open Future
I have been particularly struck by the
work of Joel Feinberg, who identified what
he called children’s “right to an open
future.”30 This right is, according to
Feinberg, “an anticipatory autonomy right”
or “a right in trust.”31 Feinberg asserts that
there are areas where the child is not capable
of making a reasoned choice now, but adult
decisions will foreclose the availability of
those rights when the child reaches requisite
maturity. Feinberg analyzes the conflict that
occurs when a child’s right-in-trust collides
with a parent’s rights, and notes that
community interests are often involved as
well.32 Although he doesn’t necessarily
challenge the ultimate result, Feinberg
criticizes the state’s deference to the
interests of Amish parents who want to limit
their children’s education because “[a]n
30

Joel Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open
Future,” from Whose Child? Children’s Rights,
Parental Authority, and State Power, edited by
William Aiken (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield,
1980), pp. 124-53.
31
Feinberg, p. 126.
32
Feinberg, p. 128.
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Thomas H. Murray, chapter 2, “Families, the
Marketplace and Values: New Ways of Making
Babies,” The Worth of a Child (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1996). See page 19, “freedom to
pursue parenthood is one of the most important
expressions of individual liberty.”
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education that renders a child fit for only
one way of life forecloses irrevocably his
other options.”33

abilities to children that they simply do not
possess. But it is also incomplete to see
childhood as merely a vehicle to adult
autonomy, an unfortunate, but necessary
weigh-station on the road to a full-fledged
personhood. Sigal Benporath acknowledges
the limitations of childhood, but argues that
one need not see this state as inferior to
adulthood. “A child should be accepted for
what she is now…childhood must not be
defined as a passing phase of impaired
maturity…it should be recognized as a
unique, yet equally significant part of human
development.”36 Rather than viewing
children solely in terms of their present
deficiencies and their future needs,
Benporath argues for adult respect for
children’s condition and adult’s consequent
obligation toward them.37 I am not
particularly interested in the distinction she
draws between children’s rights and adult
obligations, but I credit Benporath for
focusing on children as possessing special
gifts and not just special needs. Benporath
sees it as the obligation of the family and
public institutions to acculturate children the
same way one might welcome a foreigner
into our country and culture.38 She is much
more inclined to allow “children to play an
increasing decisional part in control over
their lives as they grow and develop.”39 She
also advocates “making an effort to reveal
their needs and expressed interests, through
developmental and other theories as well as
through listening to children.”40

To resolve the conflict between parents’
desire and children’s right-in-trust, Feinberg
prescribes a method of parenting whereby
parents get to know their children’s
strengths and weaknesses, and consciously
avoid boxing children into a narrow and illfitting future. The hope is that “if the child’s
future is left open as much as possible for
his own finished self to determine, the
fortunate adult that emerges will already
have achieved, without paradox, a certain
amount of self fulfillment, a consequence in
large part of his own already autonomous
choices in promotion of his own natural
preferences.”34
Feinberg emphasizes that a child’s right
to an open future is not necessarily
determined by consulting the child’s wishes.
Because of the child’s immaturity, abiding
by the child’s present desires may actually
subvert the child’s long-term interest in an
open future. As Feinberg explains,
“[r]espect for the child’s future autonomy,
as an adult, often requires preventing his
free choice now.”35
Benporath’s Notion of Childhood as an
Intrinsically Valuable Condition
Much as I am taken with Feinberg’s
approach, which strikes me as providing a
coherent organizing principle for talking
about the rights of children, there is
something troubling about rights that focus
almost entirely on the future adult and that
do not seriously confront present needs and
wants. It is a mistake to romanticize
childhood, or to attribute qualities and
33
34
35

A clear tension exists between her
approach and Feinberg’s, but Benporath
presents a necessary tonic to Feinberg’s
36

Sigal R. Benporath, “Autonomy and Vulnerability:
On Just Relations between Adults and Children,”
Journal of Philosophy of Education 37 (2003): 127,
132-33.
37
Benporath, p. 137.
38
Benporath, p. 138.
39
Benporath, p. 138.
40
Benporath, p. 138.
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Feinberg, p. 151.
Feinberg, p. 127.
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almost exclusive focus on the citizen-to-be.
Benporath reminds us that childhood
possesses the intrinsic value of being, not
just the process value of becoming.

resolving the more common problems posed
by custody battles between parents.
Although Feinberg’s theory of relying
on parents as trustees of the child’s right to
an open future is confounded by the fact that
in a contested custody matter, the parents
cannot agree, Feinberg’s principle of
maximizing the child’s right to an open
future nonetheless seems particularly apt. In
fact, a custody battle seems like a
quintessential example of a major life choice
that will affect a child’s ability to exercise
his autonomy as an adult. In the words of
Feinberg, “the child’s options in respect to
life circumstances and character will be
substantially narrowed well before he is an
adult.”43 Custody is arguably even more
vital to a child’s autonomy and ability to
direct his own future than the educational or
religious choices that serve as Feinberg’s
core examples. At least with educational
choices, under some circumstances, the
adult can compensate for deficits in his
childhood education. The choice of who
raises the child day-to-day will have an even
more profound effect on the child’s
personality, life-choices, and ability to
pursue an open future.

Applying the Scholarship of Feinberg and
Benporath to Custody Cases
Feinberg does address child custody;
however, it is in the context of an unusual
legal battle between grandparents and a
biological father. Feinberg uses the case of
Mark Painter—a notorious example of
judicial bias—to argue for applying the
principles of a child’s right to an open future
in a neutral manner. In that case, the child’s
mother was dead and the father’s countercultural lifestyle (including “dangerous”
tendencies toward Buddhism, agnosticism,
and support of the ACLU) was deemed
harmful for the child. Feinberg rightfully
denotes this case as a “horror story”41 and
argues that the state, except in extreme
situations, should not remove a child from
parental custody.
Feinberg observes that “[t]ypically, the
state must shoulder a greater burden of
justification for its interferences with parents
for the sake of their children than that which
is borne by parents in justification of their
interferences with children for the children’s
own sake.”42 This observation, which strikes
me as true, displays a persistent but unstated
assumption of Feinberg’s analysis. It
assumes that, in the state-parent-child
triangle, the parents operate as a monolith,
agreeing as to values and the child’s best
interests. Therefore, Feinberg’s focus on an
egregious case, in which the mother was
deceased, is ultimately unhelpful in

Similarly, Benporath’s work offers
guidance to a GAL making a custody
recommendation. First she reminds us of the
importance of making sure that the person
inhabiting a world of rights-in-trust is
having a happy childhood, and that this
passage of life is to be relished, not merely
tolerated. Second, she reminds us that the
world of childhood is valuable and
sometimes impenetrable to adults, and that
we may need children to guide us in
understanding their needs. The contribution
of Benporath to custody evaluations stems
from this focus on the happiness of children.
Children’s sense of wonder, their flexibility

41

Feinberg, p. 139. Feinberg argues persuasively
that “no court has the right to impose its own
conception of the good life on a child over its natural
parents’ objections.”
42
Feinberg, p. 142.

43
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Feinberg, p. 146.

and their innocence are important attributes
that the GAL should strive to cherish and
preserve. In keeping the future open for
children, we ought to take pains to
understand their unique needs so that our
efforts to do not ruin their present.

Valuing the Parent-Child Relationship
GALs often do not place enough weight
on the parent-child relationship in assessing
the child’s current happiness and rights-intrust. One need not tout parents’ rights to
make the narrower argument that children’s
rights cannot be understood without concern
and respect for parents. As Thomas Murray
notes “family bonds have an intimacy that
distinguishes them from other
attachments.”44

Both Benporath and Feinberg arguably
support a best-interests role rather than a
traditional attorney-client role for the child.
Feinberg’s open future affirmatively
anticipates occasions when the child’s
immediate desires are not consonant with his
or her long term best interests. Benporath is
more focused on the here and now, but she
seems to see the role of child as translator
for and educator of adults, not necessarily
those who make the final decisions about
major life choices.

Family law scholars and psychologists
agree that a child will best develop his
potential and will make the greatest gains in
physical and mental health if he has a
healthy relationship with both parents.
Numerous studies confirm what life
experience and common sense already tells
us, that both parents remain vital to a child’s
future well-being.45 In a noted study of the
effect of divorce on children, researchers
found that children whose parents
encouraged visitation with the non-custodial
parent were more psychologically healthy.46
Regular and meaningful contact with both
parents led to less stress, better work–
effectiveness, better socialization and less

Ethical and Practical Concerns about the
Process of Determining Children’s Best
Interests in Custody Cases
Concerns about the behavior of GALs
arise on many levels. As noted above, there
are serious debates about the best-interests
role, as opposed to a more traditional
attorney-client model. Also GALs face the
difficulty of assessing custody without
engaging in cultural and other biases.
Ideally they should focus on the welfare of
the child and the child’s right to an open
future while simultaneously protecting and
promoting a happy childhood. In addition to
these daunting tasks are two crucial aspects
of a best-interests analysis that in my
experience tend to be undervalued by GALs.
The first concerns the GAL’s duty towards
the family as a whole. The second concerns
the importance of respecting the child and
keeping the child informed and involved
even if the GAL does not follow the child’s
wishes.

44

Murray, The Worth of a Child. Similarly
Ferdinand Schoeman argues that children, at least vis
a vis their parents, don’t have rights so much as
“needs, the satisfaction of which involves intimate
and intense relationship with others.” Ferdinand
Schoeman, “Rights of Children, Rights of Parents
and the Moral Basis of the Family,” Ethics 91 (1980):
6-19; quote, p. 9. Unfortunately Schoeman focuses on
the power struggle between parents and the state and
does not consider the situation, such as a divorce
where parents do not present a united front. Hence
his arguments in favor of family privacy and his
contentions that the state should not intervene absent
a clear and present danger to the child do not easily
apply.
45
See Andrew I. Schepard, The Unfinished Business
of Modern Court Reform: Reflections on Children,
Courts and Custody, (2004), p. 21.
46
See Judith S. Wallerstein & J. Kelly, Surviving the
Break-Up: How Parents and Children Cope with
Divorce (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 107-09.
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aggression.47 Continued contact with the
non-custodial parent offers emotional
support, and potentially provides a larger
support network and greater stimulation, and
increased opportunities to interact with
diverse people and stimuli.48

parents and children, it is impossible and
undesirable to separate their interests
entirely.
Respecting the intimacy of the parentchild relationship and honoring the parents
themselves is vital to any robust notion of
the best interests of the child. As Feinberg
writes, childhood is a passage through which
children grow into their full rights as
citizens and must be prepared to exercise
those rights. A key part of the preparation
involves guidance from parents. Except in
the most extreme situations involving abuse
or neglect, it seems nonsensical to talk about
the interests of children outside a
consideration of the parent-child
relationship.49

Unfortunately, GALs sometimes behave
as if the child has little interest—emotional,
relational, social or practical—in the soonto-be defunct family unit. By narrowly
focusing on the child as individual, rather
than as a child who is part of a disintegrating
family, the custody evaluation may
ultimately ignore some crucial interests of
the child. GALs sometimes adopt a
constricted, atomized, autonomy-happy
version that myopically focuses on the child
alone. The focus on the child’s interests is
correct; the definition of those interests is
too narrow. The GAL doesn’t make the
mistake of child liberationalists who want to
impute full rational decision-making to the
child. Instead, the GAL falls into a related
error in autonomy-focus thinking.

Similarly, Benporath’s approach
requires respect for parents because they are
the primary, though not exclusive,
navigators for children through the foreign
world of adults. At their best, parents
provide the type of deep appreciation and
understanding that Benporath sees as
necessary outgrowths of children’s weak
position in the world vis-a-vis adults.

By undervaluing connection and
forgetting that meaningful autonomy often
means cultivating relationships with others,
GALs may disserve the child practically and
emotionally. Barring abuse or serious
neglect, children will be spending time with
both parents. Wisely, in my opinion, the law
totally dissociates payment of child support
from visitation. Even financially deadbeat
parents, for example, can and should spend
time with their kids. Although there is
certainly danger in conflating the interests of

In practice, however, GALs are
sometimes brutal towards parents. Wellmeaning GALs perceive their task as
ascertaining the best interests of the child,
and these well-meaning legal pugilists are
ready to slug it out on behalf of the child.
Neglecting the child’s need for intimacy,
support, stability and emotional safety of
competent, secure parents, GALs sometimes
act as if their jobs require them to behave
like Caesar in a gladiator’s duel-to-the-death
over custody. They exhibit a relentless

47

See Schepard, p. 31; Robert D. Hess & Kathleen
A. Camera, “Post-Divorce Relationships as
Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce
for Children,” Journal of Social Issues, 35 (1979): 79.
48
W. Glenn Clingempeel & N. Dickon Reppucci,
“Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and
Goals for Research,” Psychological Bulletin
91(1982): 107-09.
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The exception for abuse, neglect, and violence
between former spouses is crucial. Where parents
have behaved violently or endangered their family,
the presumption that children benefit from their
company is no longer necessarily true.
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attempt to ferret out who is the better parent,
and then to elevate that individual. As I have
witnessed it, the “better” parent is
championed and the “losing” parent is
ground into the dust, portrayed as unfit and
sometimes even dangerous to the child.
These tendencies derive from a desire to
support the GAL’s assessment of who
should “win.” However, such an approach
degrades the ability of the both parents to
nurture the children and further frays the
thin bonds of family uniting these feuding
individuals and their progeny.

not for the true best interests of the child, in
having a safe environment, including contact
with two strong and self-confident parents,
but for the GAL’s chosen result. GALs may
feel strongly about their recommendations
and feel that the best way to insulate their
preference for one parent is to degrade the
other parent. They may also over-identify
with one parent and begin to take the
decision very personally. By undervaluing
the parent-child connection and attacking
the competence, integrity, and judgment of a
parent, GALs can and often do make things
worse for parents, and ultimately children.

Certainly I would not be the first to
observe that the culture of the adversary
system is particularly ill-suited to resolving
family-law disputes.50 We hear all the time
how divorce lawyers sow discord and
distrust, making things worse, not only for
the children, but for the adults. Ironically,
the GAL, who is supposed to advocate for
the child and remain outside the role of a
traditional lawyer, often becomes infected
by a legal culture of hyper-adversarialism.
The GAL can shift from being neutral eyes
and ears of the court into an advocate for
one of the parties.

Taking Children Seriously
Custody decisions for children and early
adolescents should not be left to them
despite their obvious stake in the outcome.
Children or young adolescents are not
intellectually or emotionally mature enough
to determine their best interests. I am
particularly convinced that this is true in
custody cases. Children of divorcing parents
are particularly vulnerable to having their
childhood suddenly brought to an abrupt
halt. Divorce often thrusts new
responsibilities on children. The last thing
they need is the burden of deciding custody.
As I argue below, however, it is very
important to take the child’s wishes
seriously and to let the child teach the GAL
about his or her needs.

This happens because of the
entrenchment of a legal culture of
adversarialism. Lawyers are often bound by
habit, ego and their training as investigators
and cross-examiners. As GALs, these
lawyers often fail to understand the deeper
purpose of their inquiry. Ironically, the very
skills the lawyers bring to their evaluations
are what make their participation most
destructive. Mired in the culture of the
adversary system, the GAL often advocates

Issues of custody arguably pose more of
a challenge to Feinberg’s reluctance to let
the children decide their own interests
beyond those of education or religion. A
child might not appreciate or be able to
meaningfully evaluate his educational
options, which adults can neutrally assess.
With child custody, however, the child may
have some intuition and experience that
adults cannot access. In determining what
will maximize their long-term benefit,

50

See Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, “In the
Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform
the Adversarial System,” Fam. Ct. Rev. 4:2 (2004):
203, 204, arguing that the adversary system
disempowers and dehumanizes parents.
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children may possess some specialized
expertise on the question of their own
custody. Their time spent in intimate,
informal contact with parents give them
information that no one else can fully
access.

defined. For instance, it is within the court’s
jurisdiction to order counseling, special
education, or other support services for the
child. As part of a custody order, the court
can also require actions of the parent such as
attendance at substance-abuse counseling or
parenting classes. To combat the tendency to
get overly enmeshed in the adversarial
nature of the proceedings, GALs should
deliberately focus on the strengths of both
parents. Even, or perhaps especially, when
one parent is the clear custody winner, the
GAL should think about how to keep the
non-custodial parent involved in the child’s
life and confident about his or her parenting
skills. A parent who emerges from the
custody evaluation process humiliated and
feeling terrible about his ability to parent
will not be able to provide the child comfort
and security. A child may misread the
parent’s dejection as rejection. More
basically, at a time of immense fragility and
uncertainty, the parent’s confidence will be
further undermined. All of this combines to
deprive a child of joy and to limit his future
options.

Both Feinberg and Benporath speak to
this issue. Though Feinberg rejects a child’s
right to conclusively determine his own
rights-in-trust, he definitely sees the child as
an important participant in the process. He
observes that “from the beginning the child
must—inevitably will—have some ‘input’ in
its own shaping, the extent of which will
grow continuously even as the child’s
character itself does.”51 Benporath bases the
obligations of adults to children in respect
for the state of childhood and for the child’s
individuality. She warns that “[n]eglecting
the present perspectives of children is not
only disrespectful, and not only results in an
unjust and myopic society…it also expresses
a deep disregard for childhood itself.”52
Perhaps because children are so easy to
dismiss, GALs usually do not make the
mistake of treating children as clients who
should call the shots. As I asserted above,
GALs do fall into adversarial traps, but
slavishly following the desires of the child
client is not one of them. In fact, some
GALs seem to lean toward the other
extreme, mistakenly concluding that
children have little to offer and, therefore,
failing to take their insights and preferences
seriously.

This is not to say that GALs should
ignore or whitewash problems posed by
parents. Part of a GAL’s job is to make hard
choices and to deliver tough advice.
However, a GAL must relay negative
information or assessments with deep
respect and compassion for parents. GALs
must disclose problems honestly, but in the
least inflammatory and judgmental terms
possible. A GAL should show the parents
the report and solicit comments and
corrections.

Practical Solutions for the GAL and the
Family Court Judge

These professional obligations do not
derive from a more basic duty owed to the
parents or from any sympathy one might
have for them. They derive from the insight
that separating the interests of the child from
the strength and health of the parents relies

Practically, the GAL is in a unique role
to foster the best interests of the child.
These best interests should be broadly
51
52
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on a false and cramped view of children’s
interests.

take higher precedence after age 14, makes
good sense.

As a practical matter, GALs should
never ask a child with whom he prefers to
live.53 The child, because of his
developmental stage, the influence of adults,
and limited maturity and worldview, would
not necessarily be able to identify his own
best interests. More importantly, asking the
child puts him in an impossible position.
Respecting the child’s emotional needs and
his attachment to and fear of hurting both
parents should make GALs circumspect
about even posing the question. This
reticence should not be confused with a lack
of interest in the child’s desires. There are
many interviewing tricks to learn about the
child’s wishes and his level of attachment
and how the child can educate the GAL
about his or her best interests without
directly expressing a choice.54 GALs can
maximize the child’s good relations with
both parents and minimize any guilt he or
she might have had expressing his
preference.

Implications for Lawyers Representing
Parents
Up to this point, I have argued that
GALs, in their eagerness to promote the
child’s best interests, may undervalue the
child as a resource and fall into adversarial
behavior, despite the non-adversarial nature
of their roles. These criticisms of the way
GALs sometimes behave invite similar
questions concerning the behavior of
attorneys representing the parents.
Attorneys representing parents are by
definition adversarial and are ethically
bound to focus on the interests of their
clients, and not third parties (such as the
children). They rarely see their job as asking
questions about the children’s welfare and
tend to take their cues from their clients,
who are often in fragile, angry states.
Given the harms inflicted on children
by dueling parents, it is reasonable to
wonder whether there is a way to apply the
lessons of children’s best interests to the role
of the attorneys for the parents, without
entirely subverting the traditional attorney’s
role. May an attorney representing a parent
even consider the welfare of the children, or
would such concern for anyone other than
the client-parent constitute a conflict of
interest and ethical breach of the duty of
loyalty?55 I will not in this essay consider
this immensely important and troubling
ethical problem. Instead, my focus will
remain on the interests of the parents
because I believe that lawyers who represent
parents should be concerned about the

Obviously, there are cases where the
child directly and vociferously expresses a
strong preference. It is important that his or
her views be treated with immense respect.
The sliding developmental scale used in
Indiana, where children’s views on custody
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National Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Child
Custody, Legal and Mental Health Perspectives on
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poor judges of what they need. One could
even go so far as argue that many parents in
the midst of a divorce and custody dispute
are incapable of making rational
independent decisions.56 Such an approach
would be too radical and would clearly
trample parents’ rights. Yet, for many of the
wrongs that parents try to address in custody
cases, the language of rights is inadequate
and may, when equated with property rights,
and litigated in the same manner, be harmful
to all involved, most notably, the parents
themselves.57

children as part of their advocacy of parents’
interests.
If a child’s long-term future benefit
relies on meaningful contact with two
strong, sane parents, and, if, indeed, the
happiness of children is not easily separated
from the happiness of parents, then a fuller
notion of parents’ interests would motivate
lawyers to think differently about the
welfare of children. Rather than believing
that the children’s interests are incidental or
even in tension with those of the parents,
lawyers representing the parents could adopt
and try to communicate to their clients a
fuller view of the parents’ long-term
interests. Rather than lumping the kids in
with the Tupperware as items to be won or
lost in the divorce settlement, lawyers could
identify what is truly unique about the
parent-child relationship and counsel the
parent to look ahead to their own futures.
Attorneys should strive beyond satisfying
the divorcing adults’ perceived current need
for revenge, vindication, or victory, and
instead educate the clients about the longterm interests of the divorcing parents.
These interests include having a calm
relationship with the ex-spouse and having
healthy, happy, well-adjusted children. Just
as it would be foolish to identify the best
interests of a child without reference to the
relationship with the parent, it may be
equally foolish to represent the parent
without thinking about how decisions made
in anger and hurt at the time of divorce and
initial custody determination will affect the
web of connections with the children in the
present and in the future.
Misunderstood, this approach could
seem dangerously close to treating adult
clients like children. Just as children, for
developmental reasons, cannot be relied
upon exclusively to identify their own
interests, so too, divorcing parents, for
emotional and situational reasons, may be

I believe that the solution lies in the
ability of attorneys to counsel their clients,
affirmatively raising issues relating to
children’s long-terms interests. This is not
only fair to children (who are truly innocent
third-parties and who pose an ethical
challenge to the lawyer’s traditional roledifferentiated morality), but vital for parents.
One hopes that parents get divorced only
once. Family law attorneys see the same
squabbles all the time and they note the toll
it takes on children and the harm that legal
wrangling does to the finances, hearts, and
long-term interests of parents.58 If one were
to counsel clients based on the experience
and wisdom of seeing many such cases, it is
clear that the best advice would look to the
parents’ right to an open future. This open
56

The rules of professional conduct for lawyers
anticipate the problem of client’s incapacity and
include a special provision for clients operating under
a disability that includes requesting that a court
secure a GAL to represent the client’s best interests.
This provision (Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct) was designed for mentally ill
or mentally handicapped clients, and not for
acrimonious divorce cases.
57
See Murray, The Worth of a Child, noting how the
in the context of discussing relationships within the
family “the language of rights seems awkward and
second best.”
58
Needless to say any financial interest a lawyer
might have in prolonging the conflict can never
ethically influence the lawyer’s advice.
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children because those needs will affect the
parents’ rights-in-trust.
Both sets of arguments, about GALs
and regular attorneys, rest on the notion that
it is impossible entirely to separate the
interests of parents and children. Although
those interests may not be identical, and may
in fact conflict at times, they are inextricably
bound; it is meaningless to talk about the
best interests of the child without
considering the happiness of the parents, and
it is equally pointless to talk about the
interests of the parent without considering
the long term effects on the children.

future for the parent would entail good
relations with the ex-spouse, a meaningful
co-parenting relationship, support with
childcare, lack of tension at graduations, bar
mitzvahs and communions, etc., no
recriminations from children years later for
having been denied the company of the
other parent, and most importantly, happier
and healthier kids. Obviously, an attorney
cannot commandeer the process and set the
goals of the representation, but an attorney
can educate the client about how the
parents’ current interests and desires may
conflict with his long term rights and
interests as a parent.
Conclusion
For GALs representing children in
contested custody cases, it is vital to avoid
being seduced by the dark side of the
adversary system, and instead maintain a
commitment to ensuring, wherever possible,
the health and stability of both parents. This
is not just for reasons of decency, but
because the child’s right to an open future
depends on having strong, sane parents.
Furthermore, in determining the child’s best
interests, the GAL should take the child’s
stated wishes very seriously, but should not
feel bound by them, and should not directly
pose to the child the question of which
parent should have custody.
There are strong reasons why parents
deserve respect in their own right and why
the intimacy of their relationships with their
children must be respected. In this article,
however, I have attempted to craft a
respectful approach to parent’s rights,
interests, and personhood that derives not
from the parents themselves, but from the
needs of their children. This approach
indicates that a good lawyer should counsel
his or her clients about the needs of the
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